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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

## PROBLEMS, EXPERIENCES OF REGIONAL INNOVATION POLICY

Milan MICROS in English Nov 81 pp 80-96

[Article by Cristiano Antonelli and Franco Momigliano]

[Text]

## 1. Technology Transfer and Regional Economic Development

Technology transfer is a dynamic process in which innovations are diffused and disseminated across the industrial system.

Technology transfer takes into account at least three different forms of diffusion:

- intraindustrial horizontal, i.e. traditional diffusion of innovations among firms, active and in competition on the same markets, through imitation;
- intraindustrial vertical, i.e. diffusion of innovations among firms active in the same markets, but through co-operation;
- interindustrial, i.e. diffusion of innovations from one sector to the other through dissemination and contamination of formerly remote product and process technologies by external borrowing.

Technology transfer is a strongly space oriented event. Mostly diffusion of innovations takes place in the context of economic space; it is an aspect of external economies and develops through personal and commercial relations, manpower interfirm mobility, etc.

## 1.1. Some Experiences of Spontaneous Technology Transfer

In the Italian experience technology transfer took

\* Paper presented at the Workshop on Regional Innovation Policy. Sophia Antipolis 1st and 2nd June 1981, for the Six Countries Programme on Aspects of Government Policy towards Innovation.

place spontaneously in some industrial systems of small firms with strong characteristics of spatial specialisation, territorial concentration and horizontal integration.

In these cases technology transfer was a major factor in the development of those industrial districts.

A concise review of major empirical findings shows how technology transfer, localisation factors and previous industrial structures interacted in an evolutionary process.

R. Prodi [16] and [12] studied for over ten years the introduction and diffusion of some process innovations in the industrial district of Modena. In this case there were low fixed-capital requirements and high productivity levels; the area was specialised in the production of bricks and building materials. Consequently in the 60s and 70s the whole of industrial district experienced a fast growth with the birth of many small firms and became a strong center for the production of building materials with a consistent flow of exports towards Europe.

Studies on technological changes in the textile sector in the late sixties emphasise the strategic role of process innovation in textile machinery and the radical changes in the inputs and in the intermediary products.

In this case technology transfer made it possible for pre-existing small firms to survive though the industrial intra-and-interfirm organization of the division of labour had radically changed. [10]

P. Mariti observed the impact of new cutting technologies on an old and traditional activity such as the extraction of marble in the Pisa surroundings. He later developed it into a theoretical model, i.e. the substitution of vertical with horizontal integration and the increasing complementarity of external and

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internal economies of scale. [17]

According to F. Del Monte, the introduction of process innovations in intermediary products was at the base of the growth of the furniture sector nearby Pesaro. [6]

Similar processes were observed in the northern regions of the country, even if the industrial structure was not the same.

The small firms in the above mentioned cases were independent undertakings, with full entrepreneurial autonomy, working within a framework of spatial cooperation and integration. It was possible to find firms specialised just in a limited phase of the productive process of one item. They sold their products on competitive markets with many sellers and many buyers. [17]

In the northern regions of the country we have clear cases of large firms subcontracting small firms with vertical diffusion of innovations. [5]

In this respect empirical evidence given by the machine tool industry. Enrietti et al. analysed in depth the introduction and diffusion of innovations in the engineering sector nearby Turin, with special reference to the relationship between large firms subcontracting small ones. [7]

It would therefore appear that territorial concentration and spatial specialisation played an important role in maximising the rates of diffusion and dissemination of new technologies.

Special features of industrial structures and market forms i.e. small size of firms, a number of « perfect » tiny intermediary markets, strong subcontracting relations and low barriers to entry sustained technology transfer as a part of a more complex evolutionary process.

### 1.2. The Limits of Spontaneous Technology Transfer

Experiences in these industrial districts with small firms have shown that autonomous technology transfer was at the same time induced and seriously limited by a number of factors:

- a) the availability of a technological supply of innovations, substantially exogenous to the systems of these firms;
- b) a structural gap between the institutions which produce new technologies and firms which introduce and diffuse innovations;
- c) the small size of firms active in the diffusion and dissemination of innovations;
- d) the strategic relevance of spatial dimension in these diffusion and dissemination of innovations;
- e) the fundamental role played by market forces in the processes but were not able to sustain technology transfer beyond the borders of these industrial districts.

In other words it seems that diffusion and dissemination of innovations was limited to a few special cases

and circumstances in which technology transfer was a by-product of more complex economic relations. Subcontracting on one side and regional clusters of small specialised firms are in fact two special cases of autonomous technology transfer which were not able to spread « naturally » to the whole economic system.

## 2. Regional Innovation Policy and the Technology Transfer in Italy

The Italian innovation policy tries to include:

a) the strategic role of technology transfer to regional economic development, with special reference to the opportunities offered by technology transfer to sustain the growth of small firms in less industrialised parts of the country;

b) the limits in the spreading of autonomous technology transfer with the exception of particular industrial districts. [9] and [11]

In other words the Italian innovation policy is looking for new criteria and instruments to sustain technological transfer and to reproduce it where market forces have been unable to make it take off. [15]

*A first result of this search was that a few experts realised a policy to sustain technology transfer largely coincides with a regional innovation policy both because of its aims and of its instruments.* [3], [4] and [11]

In fact a policy to sustain technology transfer should be directed towards small firms, it should be strongly space-oriented, have low sectorial selectivity, a wide variety of instruments and operators and a substantial degree of decentralisation in the screening of research projects to sustain and in the management of available resources.

So far we can say that in Italy one regional innovation policy is moving towards three major objectives:

- to stimulate the introduction and adoption of innovations in small firms;
- to stimulate technology transfer and to direct the pace of it;
- to extend processes and experiences naturally emerged in few areas and sectors.

## 3. Experiences of the Italian Regional Innovation Policy

In the 70s, along with the different experiences of autonomous technology transfer, a number of initiatives intended to assist and stimulate the introduction and diffusion of innovations took place at a regional level.

The wide variety of instruments and aims used during the different efforts to stimulate technology

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transfer, R&D activities and the lack of a clear national policy reduce these experiences to nothing more than a first attempt to establish a regional innovations policy.

In other words there is not an integrated approach when using different instruments according to the territorial context.

The absence of any kind of central agency to coordinate regional initiatives (such as the ANVAR in France, the RKW in RF1, the IRFIA in Belgium, the TNO in Holland, etc.) [1] clearly proves the point.

Regional innovation policy in Italy can be described as matrix of instruments which sustain firms R&D activities or technology transfer at different levels of effectiveness with different criteria and instruments, organized at national and regional level.

	R&D sustain	Technology transfer sustain
National Instruments	— IMI Fund (*)	— Stazioni sperimentali FIME
	— Special program for R&D in Southern Regions (**)	— Project for incentives to advanced tertiary activities in South (****)
	— Incentives to laboratories localisation (***)	
Regional Instruments	— FINPIEMONTE	— FINPIEMONTE
	— CESTEC	— CESTEC
	— ERVET	— ERVET
	— Others	— CSATA
		— CRIS
		— CRAI
		— Others

(\*) ex legibus 1089/1968 and 675/1977 art. 10-11.

(\*\*) ex lege 183/1976 art. 8.

(\*\*\*) ex lege 183/1976 art. 13.

(\*\*\*\*) ex art. 29 of new project of law to substitute law 183/1976 expiring 31.12.1981.

### 3.1. National Instruments

The Southern Regions, the « Mezzogiorno », are the sole area of the country where regional innovation policy is included in the national one. The following list consequently includes all those instruments concerning the South.

#### A. R&D Activities

##### 1. IMI Fund

Law 25.10.1968 No. 1089 and Law 12.8.1977 No. 675 art. No. 10-11. IMI received from the government 950 billions lire since 1968 to provide grants (up to 40%) and shared financial costs (up to 80%) for research projects in firms.

40% of this amount should be attributed to firms localised in the South. IMI Fund is a clear example of a passive instrument in which firms must take the initiative to ask for the financment. No assistance to the follow-up of the research-project is considered: IMI has not been developing any dissemination or crossed-information role.

The screening of the project is fully centralised. Consequently the quota for the South has been utilised up to now only for the 26% of the resources against the 40% available. A quota of 20% of total resources has been reserved, at a national level, to small firms. At the end of 1980 only the 16% had been utilised.

#### 2. Special programs for R&D in the South

Law 2.5.1976 No. 183 art. No. 8. Within the Law 183 for the South a special programme to sustain R&D activities in the South has been established.

Local ad hoc consortia among government bodies and local Universities can be founded and financed to promote R&D projects together with industrial feasibility studies and the training and eventual employment of some 4.000 scientific manpower.

380 billions lire are available for this project which is however still at a starting up level for the lack of a coordination framework at ministerial level.

In some Regions, namely Puglia, Calabria and Sicily, it seems that the programme has some chances to induce the strenghtening of direct links among local universities and firms with beneficial effects for both.

#### 3. Incentives to Laboratories Localisation

Law 2.5.1976 No. 183 art. No. 13. Within the same Law a special fund has been created to provide grants (up to 50%) and shared financial costs (up to 70%) to stimulate the localisation of new R&D Laboratories in the South. Few Laboratories have been localised within the framework of the law and most of them are integrated in large firms incorporated in the North. A serious limit to the effectiveness of the Fund results from restrictions posed to non-economic-public bodies to take the initiative.

Spill-over has been modest with scarce effects of horizontal diffusion of innovation or creation of scientific entrepreneurship nearby. Laboratories infact remained strickly linked and vertically integrated with large firms active in the North.

#### B. Technology transfer

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4. Stazioni sperimentali del ministero dell'Industria

It seems worthwhile to remember that 50 years ago the Ministry of Industry established the Stazioni Sperimentali. They were a kind of sectorial technology centers, localised in highly specialised industrial regions to assist firms to introduce technological innovations in different sectors. Since then, the role of Stazioni Sperimentali declined, nowadays is reduced to some training activities for technical manpower and only 8 of them are still alive.

Many experts suggest that the Stazioni Sperimentali might be utilised more actively within a regional innovation policy framework.

5. FIME, Finanziaria Meridionale

FIME has been established as a public-owned company in midseventies with the special role of trading-company and venture-capital provider to assist small firms incorporated in the South to find new export markets, new partners, to have access to foreign licences and patents, to finance new technology-intensive investment.

FIME seems to have realised a good work, although related to a limited number of initiatives, in last years through a continue screening of potential growth firms.

Strategy of FIME seems to consist in substantial picking southern winners to establish commercial and technological links with northern and foreign companies they could not realise themselves.

6. Project for incentives to advanced tertiary activities in the South

Art. 29 of the Project for a new Law.

Law 183 will expire at the end of 1981. A governmental project for a new special Law for the South has been already presented to the Parliament.

Major points regarding regional innovation policy of Law 183/1976 have been confirmed and ameliorated.

A new instrument will be however introduced. Financial assistance will be in fact expanded to some service-firms as well.

Two major conditions are requested:

a) to have more than 25 employees and to be incorporated in the South.

b) only advanced activities such as management consulting, engineering, marketing, new product evaluation, technology transfer and diffusion of innovations will be supported.

This project largely reflects the assessment on the role of productive services in stimulating and disseminating technological change emerged in those cases of innovative industrial districts above considered.

3.2. Regional Instruments

Regional instruments are the result of local ini-

tiatives which have been taking place in 70s.

In two cases Regions approved Regional Laws to sustain technology transfer. This is the case of Friuli Venezia Giulia which, with the R. Law 3.6.1978 N° 47, provides grants up to the 30% of total costs, for the localisation or the enlargement of Research Laboratories and for research projects of regional interest.

Sicily, with the R. Law 4.12.1978 N° 57 and 58, provides grants and shared costs up to the 50% of total costs of researches devoted to the development of solar energy technologies in Sicily.

In most cases Regions decided to establish institutions to support locally those cases of autonomous technological transfer. This is for instance the case of Piemonte with FINPIEMONTE, Lombardia with CESTEC, Emilia-Romagna with ERVET.

In some case local government bodies together with local Universities promoted the establishment of a technological center mainly to spread some spill-over effects around scientific centers. This is the case of CSATA, nearby Bari and Bari University, CRITA, nearby Pisa and its University, and CRAI nearby Cosenza and the University of Calabria.

Finally private undertakings were established to sustain technological transfer, mostly at a cooperative level such as CNOS Tecnoservizi by Confindustria with centers in Genova, Roma, Torino, Parma, Trieste, Ascoli Piceno.

We limit here to take into account three cases only, within which we find instruments to sustain R&D activities at a regional level and technology transfer.

1. FINPIEMONTE

FINPIEMONTE is a financial company jointly owned by Regione Piemonte (majority of shares) and representatives of firms associations and local government authorities.

Finpiemonte has already developed three projects to stimulate R&D activities and technology transfer for firms localised in Piedmont; a new programme will be launched in the next months.

a) Stimulation of technological supply

Important research laboratories of large firms (FIAT, Olivetti, etc.) are localised in Piedmont.

Some evidence shows that these laboratories produce much a larger and a wider amount of technological innovations than those actually introduced in firms of the group. This surplus of innovations is usually patented but unexploited. Nobody in fact takes care to look for a commercial use of these licences: in the Research Lab, such functions are not even considered, in the firm technologies are evaluated only for eventual application, outside the

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firm for lack of information.

Finpiemonte has developed a programme to fill this gap between a potential supply and a potential demand for technology.

Special financial grants are available to firms which invests to commercialise technology, i.e. to sell technologies and to buy technologies.

The major objective of such a programme is to create within Research laboratories a commercial and profit-oriented attitude towards minor or casual innovations.

#### b) Stimulation of integrated technological structures

Finpiemonte has developed a concept of technology as a chain of services: *information* about new technologies, *training* of manpower in innovated capital goods or services, maintenance of existing capital goods, quality control are the most important points.

Diffusion and dissemination of innovations can be accelerated through the combined assistance to this chain of technological services.

In this view Finpiemonte has financed two pilot experiences in Biella and Orbassano to develop within a same local institution an integrated supply of technological services to small firms.

#### c) Stimulation of technological consortia

Finpiemonte had a strategic role in the birth of the first consortium of small electronic firms in Piedmont.

23 firms operating in different sectors of electronics have been induced to establish a research consortile laboratory where to centralise all R&D activity performed separately.

#### d) Provision venture of capital

Venture capital will be provided in next months by Finpiemonte through a special instrument to match the difficulties put by inefficient Italian Stock Markets.

Finpiemonte will in fact finance small firms or individuals with interesting technological projects on the basis of a participation not to the capital stock, but to the patent and to the royalties that the firm itself will later pay to use it.

### 2. ERVET

A different approach has been developed by Regione Emilia-Romagna where technological innovations are directly produced within three industrial districts specialised in the production of bricks and china, small foundries and agricultural machines. Technological Centers to perform directly R&D activities in different technologies have been founded.

Small firms can apply the Technological center to solve technological problems on one side. On the other hand the Technological Centers perform an autonomous role of dissemination and cross-information among all firms.

Technological centers have thus a double role to cope with a demand for technology already expressed by firms, and to stimulate a new demand for technology.

### 3. CESTEC

Regione Lombardia is trying to develop an experiment half-way between those of Regione Piedmont and Regione Emilia-Romagna. CESTEC has been founded as a body to act as a Technology Center and as a Technological Services Provider.

CESTEC has been founded as a profit institution.

CESTEC has thus two major roles: on one side it performs directly R&D activities for group of firms or sectorial associations, on the other side it organises R&D activities for firms, i.e. acts a link between a demand for technology expressed by firms and a potential supply for technology existing in public and private Research Laboratories.

### 4. The Debate on the Models of the Italian Regional Innovation Policy

The attempts to assist technological change at a regional level in many countries seem to correspond to two main models: [8]

a) a centralised model, in which regional innovation policy is conceived as a mean to circulate information and resources, so as to stimulate the introduction and diffusion of innovations at a regional level, along criteria and lines elaborated centrally;

b) a decentralised model, with a series of autonomous activities based on direct involvement and participation, i.e. organizations to stimulate the introduction of innovations according to the particular features of their economic and industrial setting.

In Italy in the last 6-7 years a debate took place between those in favour of decentralization and those against it and for centralization. [8]

On one side the Regional Governments, or at least some of them, tried to prove the innovation policy was a regional matter. On the other hand problems of resources, dishomogeneity of the country's economic conditions, the particular problem of the underdeveloped South became the arguments in favour of a centralised model.

Both models have positive and negative aspects. The decentralised model makes it possible to focus on the specific characteristics of technological change in each area. For instance programs to assist the



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vertical diffusion of innovations have been developed in Piedmont, programs to assist horizontal diffusion have been introduced in Emilia-Romagna. Cooperative research among medium-size firms has been stimulated in Lombardy.

However a decentralised model seems to suffer because there is no overall national strategy concerning innovation and economic policies. Clearly, in Italy the main objective of any national economic policy is the effort to reduce the existing unbalance of economic conditions in different parts of the country. Special efforts at a regional level may take place, to sustain firms or sectors which would otherwise naturally 'warm southward.

Furthermore regional innovation policy within a decentralised model may suffer in many cases due to the lack of opportunities to stimulate vital intra-sectoral technology transfer because of the different and remote localisation of upward or downward industrial activities.

A decentralised model clearly implies some duplications of efforts; it has not a global outlook on the rate and direction of technological change as whole, and operative dimensions are often below the threshold of the efficient size.

On the other hand a regional innovation policy in a centralised model may stimulate technology transfer by modifying localisation criteria of research-intensive activities, and thus favor less developed regions. The main purpose of the centralised approach in Italy was in fact to induce firms to localise their innovative activities in the South. It was hoped this would produce a spill-over effect on the surroundings.

Only in some cases it can be said that a spatial spill-over took place. Mostly the effects were limited to few local subcontractors with scarce dynamic consequences.

The second negative consequence of the centralised model is the lack of instruments, procedures to stimulate small firms to apply for the public sustain.

The implementation of a centralised suffers for the fact that small firms and less industrialized regions are not able to evaluate their technological needs. Consequently they cannot choose the right technological opportunities, express demands for technology and gain access to the centralized instruments.

The IMI-Fund for technological innovation has a compulsory quota of 40% of total resources available, for firms operating in Southern Italy: only 26% have been utilised. The paradoxical result is that a substantial part of the total resources cannot be touched. In the meantime over 69% of the projects to be financed have been submitted by firms from two regions: Lombardy and Piedmont.

In other words where the local technological ca-

capacity is very poor (private and public researchers in the South account for 5% of the total research population - 35% of Italians live in that area) a centralised model seems too remote and generic to stimulate the introduction and diffusion of innovation responding to local conditions. As far as Italy is concerned, it can be said that the greatest limit of this approach consists in a substantial difficulty to interact with local communities and local problems, i.e. to produce actual technology transfert. The real limit of a centralised model seem to be the selectiveness it engenders in its audience, thus reducing potential sustain to large firms or particular small firms with high technological standards usually localised in highly industrialised regions.

It would therefore appear, as far the Italian experience is considerable, that both a centralised approach and a decentralised approach to the regional innovation policy, are not perfectly able to accomplish their delicate task.

Interindustrial and intersectoral diffusion of innovation was in a few areas and in a few sectors a fundamental aspect of technological change. The introduction of new capital goods or different capital goods in traditional processes, the substitution of traditional intermediary products or inputs with new inputs, the increasing role of advanced productive services (service-processing, trading-companies, new financial services, accountancy agencies, marketing agencies, advertising companies, etc.) were a major factor to update the technological standard of a small fraction of the small firm system. This process shows some tendency to reduce its rate of propagation because of technological problems and because of the difficulties to cross the natural boundaries of industrial districts in which these processes took place spontaneously.

Intraindustrial diffusion of innovation suffers for similar problems if horizontal processes are considered: i.e. the steady rate of imitation within limited industrial districts reduce the opportunities for further advances.

Vertical processes of intraindustrial diffusion mostly linked to subcontracting relations suffer because of a growing tendency of large firms to keep under strict control new technologies and to subcontract only traditional working processes. In this case as well the small firms system seems to face a reduction in the opportunity to receive freely innovations from the economic environment through normal market transactions.

At the end of the seventies small firms too face the vital need to produce technology as a product, instead of a by-product. It is thus necessary to create a demand for technology, a supply for technology, and a place to let them meet: a market for technology.

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*The real objective for a regional innovation policy should be the effort to reproduce artificially those processes of technological transfer and those economic and technological conditions which took naturally place during the seventies in a few areas and a few sectors.*

Such a project would then imply:

a) the effort to establish new links among different regional clusters and sectors, so to eventually create new conditions for the flow of interindustrial diffusion of innovations. It seems necessary to reproduce in new sectors those conditions of physical and commercial contiguity among activities as for instance textile engineering and textile chemistry in textiles;

b) the effort to revitalise and extend intraindustrial horizontal diffusion of innovations in new industrial districts in which a capacity for new imitation processes still exists but has not yet been exploited. This implies to create a demand for technology which firms were not yet able to express, and what is more difficult, to act as a dynamic factor engendering spatial processes of imitation and diffusions within new industrial districts;

c) the effort to control with technological criteria subcontracting between large and small firms so to create new room for vertical processes of intraindustrial diffusion of new technologies.

The creation of « Borse di Conto Terzi » where technology-intensive subcontracting may be assisted and favoured, seems to be an useful instrument.

## 5. Conclusions

It seems necessary to go beyond the alternative centralised/decentralised model and to build a more complex model based on a network of local institutions with high degrees of autonomy and participation integrated in a national system and interacting each other within a global framework managed by a Central Agency.

Recently a group of expert, on behalf of the Ministero per il Coordinamento della Ricerca Scientifica e Tecnologica, has presented a project to establish a National Information Center and a National Committee for the Technological Information and the Technology Transfer. [14]

The National Information Center should consist substantially in a Central Data Bank providing technological information to Territorial Institutions and retrieving and crossing information on the demand for technology in different parts of the country set up by the Territorial Institutions.

The National Committee should have the role of Advisory Board to the activities of the National Information Center, and to suggest new guidelines for the national policy to sustain technology transfer. This project has not yet been presented to the Par-

liament and some new hypothesis have been developed since then to enlarge the scope of activity of the National Information Center.

It seems in fact more and important to stress that a policy to sustain the technology transfer is in fact the bulk of a regional innovation policy.

A National Information Center should perform at the same time the task of sustaining the technology transfer and the R&D activities in small firms at a regional level.

It seems thus necessary to establish a new integrated model for a regional innovation policy and a technology transfer policy, i.e. a two-stage model based on:

1) a Central Agency with general functions such as:

- i) retrieval, diffusion and organisation of technological information to and from Territorial Institutions;
- ii) organisation and distribution to Territorial Institutions of resources available to the sustain of R&D activities in small firms;
- iii) transmission to Territorial Institutions of the guidelines and strategies issues of national innovation policy and retrieval of suggestions and reactions from Territorial Institutions to update and reshape national guidelines;

2) a network of Territorial Institutions with specific functions such as:

- i) brooking activities for patents and licences both domestic and foreign;
- ii) diffusion of technological know-how through the supply of qualified information about technological patterns;
- iii) supply of advanced productive services to firms such as new process and product technologies evaluation, assistance to the introduction in the productive processes and in commercial activities of innovations;
- iv) screening of research projects submitted for financment by small firms.

Such a National Information Center might be the missing link in the matrix of instruments of the Italian regional innovation policy.

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POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

MAUROY, OTHERS SEE NEED FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE PILLAR

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 4 Dec 81 p 114

[Article by Jerome Dumoulin]

[Text] "I am undoubtedly the Prime Minister of change," said Pierre Mauroy at the Institute for Advanced Studies on National Defense (IHEDN) on 14 September, "But there is at least one matter which requires continuity: the imperatives of defense."

In this realm the already seen is definitely superior to "constant and continuing reform." The revival of the WEU [Western European Union] by the Socialist Party is due--as it was under Pompidou 8 years ago--to a wish and a fear: the wish for a French-style European unity and the fear of a serious danger to key elements of the country's security.

The WEU was founded in 1954 at the urging of Pierre Mendes France--after Paris rejected the plan of a European Defense Community--in order to provide a framework for German rearmament and bring together the European members of NATO. The WEU is still the only European assembly with jurisdiction in defense matters. And, as such, it is anathema to the Communists.

On 14 September a communication from Pierre Mauroy before the IHEDN: "Europeans should think," he said, "about the possibility of a political group with an autonomous defense." On 17 November, before the Defense Committee of the WEU, the Socialist deputy from Pas-de-Calais, Lucien Pignion, pointing out Europe's relative weakening and the increased Soviet threat, advocated a "European defense area which would enable us to finally (...) build the European pillar of NATO." This is a concept dear to the old Socialist guard and was often mentioned by Robert Pontillon, who until recently was responsible for international affairs and defense under Pierre Mauroy.

Finally, Georges Lemoine, Secretary of State for Defense, in an interview with MATIN DE PARIS, and then again before the WEU assembly, recalled that the WEU is "the only recognized legal entity which unites seven European countries<sup>1</sup> in an

<sup>1</sup> France, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg

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alliance of mutual assistance in case of aggression." And he referred explicitly to the statements made at the WEU in November 1973 by Michel Jobert, who was then Pompidou's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

There is a striking continuity in these statements. In 1973 Jobert expressed two fears and made two assertions:

--The fear that the arms control negotiations between the two great powers will extend to the French and British nuclear forces. Leonid Brezhnev is demanding today that they should; the Minister of Defense, Charles Hernu, in his statement to the IHEDN on 16 November, tried to prove that "this is not in the interest of the USSR."

--The fear of seeing a zone with a special legal and political status created in the center of Europe: the old Rapacki plan of the denuclearization and neutralization of the center of the old continent, which would leave western Europe in a position of extreme weakness vis-a-vis Moscow. This is what the Soviets--echoed by the PCF in Paris--are now calling "the real zero option."

--The assertion that loyalty to NATO is "in no way incompatible with Europe's need to be responsible for its own defense." On one hand, it is a matter of not relying blindly on the American guarantee, and, on the other, not skidding along the path of the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik. President Francois Mitterrand seems very much aware of the risks of a new German "national neutralism." And he has often expressed the wish for a general review of the tasks of the Alliance.

--The assertion that France's strategic nuclear force, "due to its deterrent role, contributes to the general strengthening of the Alliance, thereby increasing Europe's contribution to the common effort." This reasoning was solemnly approved by the Allies the following year in Ottawa, but it now confronts the Socialists with a terrible dilemma. One school of thought, more pro-NATO, dwells--with Mauroy--on what the Giscardians called "enlarged deterrence." Everyone is careful not to use those words, but the idea is there. Another school of thought, more nationalistic, reasons--with Hernu--in terms of "sanctuarization." It contends, not illogically, that this is the only way to avoid yielding to the Soviets' wish to include French nuclear forces in their reckoning of western vectors.

"Since the Europeans want to talk about security," cries Claude Cheysson, Minister of External Relations, "We must revive the WEU!" Paris supports the WEU's wish to set genuine cooperation in motion in Europe in the realm of defense. Whether this is a concrete project or a pious wish--neither London nor Bonn are fans of the WEU--the suggestion is meant to exorcise France's fears about what it considers to be the foundations of its security.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BERNHARD VOGEL ON BUDGET, COALITION, PEACE MOVEMENT

Hamburg STERN in German 3 Dec 81 pp 256, 258

[Excerpt from interview with Rhineland-Palatinate Minister-President Bernhard Vogel by STERN editors Heiner Bremer and Felix Schmidt: "The Coalition Is Doing Itself In"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] CDU Minister-President Bernhard Vogel of Mainz told STERN why he does not intend to help the Bonn government out of its difficulties, how he visualizes the dialogue with the younger generation and where he intends to make corrections in his educational reform program.

STERN: It isn't only the federal government that's in bad shape financially; the states are, too. Isn't the Union -- which supplies the head of government in six states -- cutting off its nose to spite its face by rejecting the austerity laws in the Bundesrat [Upper House of FRG Parliament]?

Vogel: There's a joint responsibility for the federal, state and municipal budgets. It's for that very reason that we objected to the package of legislation, for although the federal government thought about itself, it gave practically no consideration at all to the states and cities. Furthermore, we're against increases in taxes and assessments of any kind. We have to cut expenditures, not increase income. Once the federal government realizes that, a compromise can be discussed.

STERN: CDU heads of states have proposed cuts in support for schoolchildren and in social assistance. So now it's hitting the defenseless and the very poor.

Vogel: I see it differently. I think it's necessary basically to stop supporting schoolchildren who can live at home. In the case of social assistance, we advocate cuts to ease the strain on municipal budgets.

STERN: Isn't there more behind this rejection than meets the eye -- namely the hope of having the coalition break up over these issues?

Vogel: The coalition won't break apart when the CDU wants it to, but only when it no longer has a community of interests. The coalition is doing itself in.

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STERN: If the CDU had to assume responsibility for the government, would the chancellor's name be Stoltenberg or Kohl?

Vogel: The CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag elects the chancellor. If it should come to a change of administrations during this legislative term, I have no doubt that the parliamentary group will elect Chairman Kohl as chancellor.

STERN: Herr Strauss recently paid a call on Herr Schmidt. Was there perhaps talk of a Grand Coalition between CDU and SPD during this meeting?

Vogel: I don't understand the fuss over this meeting. A few weeks ago the chancellor spent an hour and a half with me in my office. That conversation didn't shake up the republic. After all, it's a completely normal thing for the chancellor and the minister-presidents to talk with each other....

STERN: ...is a Grand Coalition also talked about then?

Vogel: No. In especially threatening times -- which I don't see now -- I could picture a government made up of all the parties, but I associate bad memories with the Grand Coalition....

STERN: ...which ones, for example?

Vogel: With the Grand Coalition between 1966 and 1969, there was no longer any effective opposition in parliament. Anyone who wanted to raise any criticism had to find other forms of confrontation -- extraparlimentary opposition, for instance. I venture to assert that the alienation of the younger generation had its origins in the time of the Grand Coalition.

STERN: For several years the younger generation and the CDU didn't talk to each other. Now your party has just made an effort to resume the dialogue at its party congress in Hamburg. Was this a unique occurrence?

Vogel: Hamburg was certainly unique in terms of the way in which a party congress talked with the younger generation. But it mustn't stop there. Right now we need a thousand little Hamburgs so we can continue the youth dialogue at the lower levels of the party as well.

STERN: Will your party colleagues talk with anyone who has questions for the CDU, or is the dialogue to be conducted only with selected young people, as was the case at the party congress?

Vogel: Anyone who asks questions for the purpose of entering into a serious exchange of ideas, and also of listening to answers, can take part in a dialogue with us -- without qualification.

STERN: A guaranteed peace is a central problem for broad segments of the youth population. What can the CDU offer the peace movement?

Vogel: We have to come to grips with the positions that are represented there instead of simply ignoring them or dismissing them....

STERN: ...as your party chairman Helmut Kohl did with his contention that a "popular front" was demonstrating on 10 October in Bonn....

Vogel: ...Helmut Kohl didn't put it that way. In that demonstration of 300,000 people, you have to differentiate between the initiators, between those who appealed for participation -- among them were organizations that have been judged by the federal interior minister to be antidemocratic -- and those who attended, the majority of whom certainly had nothing to do with communists. It's uncalled for to tar these people with the same brush and shove them into a category where they don't belong.

STERN: You're an advocate of doing away with the practice of examining the moral views of conscientious objectors. The CDU's party congress went along with you. What might the long-overdue reform of conscientious objection look like?

Vogel: My state will present a reform proposal. The important thing here is that there be an increase in the number of substitute service billets, so it will be guaranteed that every conscientious objector will be performing substitute service. You can't limit substitute service to the social sphere; you have to broaden it....

STERN: ...for example?

Vogel: Environmental protection suggests itself. Those who are performing substitute service can do something for our woodlands, for our rivers, and they can do landscape maintenance. And we'll probably have to make the term for substitute service about 6 months longer than that for military service.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BOERNER STANDS FIRM ON FRANKFURT AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION

Hamburg STERN in German 3 Dec 81 p 292

[Article by Rudolf Mueller and Peter Hoebel: "A Tough Hessian Chops Wood"]

[Text] Why Minister-President Holger Boerner does not intend to allow a referendum on the runway construction.

Hesse's Minister-President Holger Boerner (SPD) remained as tough as nails. Despite massive citizen protests, he declared before parliament last week in Wiesbaden: "Construction of the west runway is inevitable." The hopes by environmentalists of still being able to prevent the disputed mammoth project at Frankfurt airport by means of a referendum were swept away by these words from Boerner: "This petition is unconstitutional."

The initiators of the referendum hope to achieve the following result with their bill: The Hesse State Planning Law would dictate that the Frankfurt airport may be expanded only within the Frankfurt city limits -- but part of the planned "west runway" is situated on land belonging to Ruesselsheim. This stipulation would be binding upon all authorities and communal parliaments normally involved in this planning. Moreover, conservation organizations would be accorded the right to file suit in administrative courts if the environment should be endangered by the airport construction.

Since this bill would make it impossible to enlarge Frankfurt airport as intended, Holger Boerner is fighting it with all his might: "A runway opponent can continue to be a runway opponent, but...anyone who calls for violence or seeks to blackmail a democratic government is putting an axe to the roots of our democracy."

The final authority that could still change Boerner's hard line would be the Hesse State Court. But the minister-president even has a perspective on this eventuality: "The state government is confidently awaiting the verdict of the court."

His optimism is justified, for there are no runway opponents on Hesse's highest court, to which the state legislature elects high-caliber jurists -- judges, attorneys and professors. The president of the State Court is Karl-Heinz Niders; he simultaneously heads the Hesse Administrative Court (VGH) in Kassel. And he has thus far struck down all 104 appeals against the runway project. Judge Ruth Sturm-Wittrock is the full-time chairman of the "Runway Division" at the VGH. Judge Virgilio Rolleri is the legal representative of Hesse's economics minister in court

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cases involving the runway. And Judge Johannes Strelitz used to be an SPD interior and justice minister in Wiesbaden.

The Hesse state government has never left any room for doubt that the public would not be permitted to vote on the runway. Even weeks before the citizens marched to Wiesbaden with their 220,249 signatures, the Boerner administration had sought an expert opinion from law professors Willi Bluemel and Michael Rollenfisch from Speyer. The result: They found that the bill which the citizens' action groups wanted to put to a vote was in violation "of the Hesse state constitution and the Basic Law."

The professors pointed out that "the federal government" has "exclusive legislative authority" over air traffic; for this reason alone, the bill presented by the citizens' action groups was in violation of the Basic Law. But they said that the bill would be unconstitutional even without this exclusive authority, because it arbitrarily restricted the jurisdictions of communal parliaments and was thus in violation of the communal autonomy guaranteed in the Basic Law.

The opponents of the runway sent Professor Helmut Ridder into the expert-opinion fray. He vigorously denies that the federal government has responsibility for Frankfurt's airport: "The bill of the citizens' action groups provides for restricting the area of the airport to the city limits of Frankfurt." Thus, only problems of area planning are involved, and these are exclusively state concerns. He says the federal government can only say how something is to be built, while it is up to the states to decide where it will be built. He maintains that the planned law does not violate communal planning authority. Moreover, nowhere does it say that no plebiscite may be held on a zoning law.

Backup fire is being provided by Walter Schwenk, the federal Transport Ministry's aviation expert. This year he published the "Handbook of Air Traffic Law"; page 253 reads as follows: "Planning authority for airports lies with the states. They consequently decide on the need and location for the construction of airports. The federal government therefore has no direct influence on the planning of airports."

Boerner the tough Hessian is concerned less with the experts' dispute than with the "unconditional safeguarding of the constitutional state" in the face of the fractious citizens. His position is that there must be "no self-made law"; the state government will therefore "resist in the interest of our state" all "attempts to exert pressure." In other respects the chief executive is not so delicate:

For instance, 1.5 hectares of woodland surrounding the airport grounds have been cleared, even though the state government had given these assurances shortly beforehand: "Not a single tree must fall outside the planned area.";

Contrary to legal regulations, conservation organizations were not brought in on the technical planning operations;

Hesse's minister for environmental affairs has never approved the overall construction of the runway, although this is a stringent requirement;

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The shantytown put up by the runway opponents was removed and destroyed as the result of a police order from Frankfurt. The Frankfurt Administrative Court expressed this opinion on the action: "Patently illegal." This is because the shantytown was situated on land belonging to Ruesselsheim and would thus have been the affair of the Ruesselsheim construction authorities.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CSU FAVORS EXPULSION OF PEACE RESEARCHER MECHTERSHEIMER

Hamburg STERN in German 3 Dec 81 pp 262, 264

[Article by Wolf Perdelwitz: "Expulsion Rather Than Dialogue?--The Mechtersheimer Case is an Example of the Politicians' Intolerance of Arms Critics"]

[Text] When peace is the issue, the CSU loses self control. "If they want a fight again, just let them start," said its secretary general, Edmund Stoiber, threateningly on the fringes of Hamburg's CDU party conference to the liberal wing of the sister party. Because the unthinkable had not only been thought about by them it had even been put into words: after the CSU had slapped a party exclusion hearing on its unpopular member, peace researcher Dr Alfred Mechtersheimer, the CDU's district organizations planned to offer him a new political asylum.

This was already the second expulsion proceeding against Mechtersheimer this year. The first one was concluded on 14 May with a compromise which imposed restraint on both sides for the future: the scientist was to keep his distance from like-minded leftwingers in his battle against the NATO counterarming program; the party on the other hand was to regard Mechtersheimer's criticism of arms policy as his privilege to conduct independent research. But the compromise started falling apart on 10 October when the scientist made his speech during Bonn's peace demonstration.

To Ekkehardt Voigt, chairman of the CSU's defense policy panel, this finally made Mechtersheimer one of the "false prophets who use scientific research as a cover to play Moscow's game by serving as useful imbeciles." If the Bavarian defense man had only known that 2 days after the demonstration the peace researcher had had a 3-hour tete-a-tete with Ambassador Vladimir Semyonov in the Soviet residence in Bad Godesberg, he would surely have concluded therefrom that the Occident was in danger.

Despite this, ex-officer Mechtersheimer's concept of homeland and country is bone-conservative, certainly much more conservative than that of the majority of the CSU leadership. This has however some surprising consequences for security politics: "Anyone who today refuses to enter military service can use the argument that he wants to defend his country--not to annihilate it." Also: "Defense equals protection; but protection does not equal the annihilation of the other side--that smacks of a cowboy mentality." That is why to him it is obvious that in the age of weapons of mass destruction security cannot be attained militarily, but only by political means--an insight which is increasingly being discussed within the CDU and its youth affiliate.

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The Young Union is therefore urging that the peace researcher be welcomed into the CDU. Says Mechtersheimer to STERN: "In starting this process the CSU has removed itself from the discussion about peace and security."

Both events--probable exclusion and possible exile--appear to be predestined. Mechtersheimer, a vehement and expert critic of current security policy and of NATO's counterarming with new nuclear medium range weapons for Western Europe, is disturbed by the image of a monolithic CSU whose eagerness to arm might even win the respect of U.S. President Ronald Reagan. Within the CDU on the other hand, at least such thoughtful men as former Secretary General Kurt Biedenkopf have started a thought process to the effect that for the FRG, defense with nuclear weapons would be tantamount to annihilation.

Says Mechtersheimer, who entered the ranks of the Bavarian CSU by immigrating from Berlin: "Intellectually I have always remained in the CDU." As a result, the brilliant air force officer had always been suspect to his new southern party comrades. Unwilling to compromise, he had more faith in the power of arguments than in beery old-boy conspiracy. It was therefore practically a miracle that in 1973 he became the CSU Landtag candidate and therefore automatically a delegate. This happened even though his intra-party rival at that time was the then Bavarian peasant leader Otto Freiherr von Feury. Strauss himself had to help out to ensure a hair's breadth 21-19 vote victory for the head peasant: "We must support the peasantry--intelligence we have ourselves."

Mechtersheimer's membership in the CSU's defense policy panel did not last long. Because not only the food suppliers are the fair-haired boys in Germany's south; there is also that part of industry which helps the Bundeswehr to live up to its recruiting slogan: "We sell security."

The Free State is the center of the German arms industry. And one of the center pieces of this branch of the economy is the aerospace company Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm, known as MBB, main German manufacturer of the Tornado fighter aircraft. It was therefore most undesirable to have, of all things, a member of the CSU, Alfred Mechtersheimer, come out with the most unfavorable criticism to date of the miracle bird (STERN No. 13/1978: "The Plucked Bird"). According to him, the Tornado was much too expensive, of limited use to the Bundeswehr's requirements, and was being built more for political than for military reasons. This incisive prognosis has been justified by events.

These criticisms were all the more weighty since Mechtersheimer was at the time still a lieutenant colonel in the air force. There was of course a quick change in this status, with energetic assistance by the Social Democrat-led defense ministry.

When Mechtersheimer applied for 2 years' unpaid leave to conduct scientific research, as every officer is entitled to do, Minister Hans Apel himself denied the request, as persistent rumor has it. Mechtersheimer, unbending as always, took off his uniform, renounced any pension claims and joined the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg as a scientist.

The new man infused new life into moribund peace and conflict research. It really needed that, because its work hardly ever was anything more than a repeated rehash

of well-known prior publications. Original thinkers like Carl-Friedrich von Weizsaecker, Dieter Senghaas or Horst Afheldt were rare exceptions to the rule. For that reason, FRG peace and conflict research, unlike in many Western countries, did not exert any notable direct influence upon government policy.

And even this moderate influence is being significantly reduced. Union-governed Laender Bavaria and Lower Saxony, to be followed by Baden-Wuerttemberg, are quitting the "German Society for Peace and Conflict Research" which is partially funded by the Federal Government and the Laender. And the Max Planck Society dissolved Starnberg's Institute for Life Conditions of the Scientific and Technological Society when its director, Carl-Friedrick von Weizsaecker, retired; it had been the most highly esteemed conflict research institute in the FRG. Mechttersheimer, one of the intellectual prime movers in Starnberg, was fobbed off with a short-term, poorly paying contract. It appears that there is an effort to stifle the "smoldering fire of peace discussion."

But Mechttersheimer's arguments have in the meantime been widely heard. He has found private sources to finance a part of his research, among them the many lecture tours which he uses to fight for a "European" security policy which has very little in common with government policy.

The Max Planck Society's Starnberg operation has in the meantime been designated the Institute for Social Sciences. But the Society, which continues to be supported almost exclusively by taxpayers' funds, is still detecting too much enthusiasm for peace and security. In Starnberg there will shortly be distributed stationery with a new letterhead: "Institute for Social Sciences (being disbanded)".

Fortunately, other projects of the widely dispersed Max Planck Society have not been touched by budget cuts. Among them: the extremely important investigation on how songbirds can be taught to whistle folk songs.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

CONFLICT BETWEEN CARRILLO AND BASQUE COMMUNISTS DETAILED

Lerchundi vs. Carrillo

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 9 Nov 81 pp 45-48

[Article by Angel and Gorka Landaburu]

[Text] Below a large banner with the words "National Assembly, Leftist Unity, National Reconstruction of Basque Homeland, Eurocommunism" and before an already convinced audience, Carrillo lashed out harshly against the current general secretary of the EPK [Basque Communist Party]-PCE: "Lerchundi's irresponsibility is that he began to negotiate alone with the Basque Left, behind the PCE's back. The Lerchundi faction has ruined the possibility of leftist unity."

Lerchundi replied that afternoon with a similar attack: "These men, who have shattered the EPK, have demonstrated their inability to solve Basque problems and even the inability to obtain an assembly, thus they had to turn to Carrillo to fill a movie theater."

By his visit to the Basque country last Sunday, Santiago Carrillo personally conveyed the PCE Executive Committee's endorsement of Ramon Ormazabal and officially confirmed the schism among Basque communists.

The presence of the PCE general secretary, accompanied by Nicolas Sartorius and Jaime Ballesteros, in Sestao and at the assembly held by the secessionist faction opposed to Roberto Lerchundi and the leadership which resulted from the Fourth Congress, confirmed the decision made several days earlier by high communist leaders to dissolve the EPK Central Committee and to appoint a provisional leadership more amenable to Carrillist views.

This endorsement of the Ormazabal faction, which runs counter to the process of convergence with the Basque Left-EIA [expansion unknown], that was being pursued by the EPK's present leadership, was thus made official before 2,000 persons assembled in the Amezaga movie theater in the manufacturing town of Sestao.

Battle for Numbers

The Sestao assembly, which soon turned into a rally, made it possible to bring out into the open the battle for numbers, which has been the main bone of contention in the crisis between the two factions, the "Carrillists" and the "Nationalists," from the beginning. The presence of about 2,000 people in Sestao, most of whom

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were old members past the age of 40, actually facilitated the possibility of determining the ratio of forces between Ormazabal and Lerchundi. Thus if the EPK has about 4,500 members in the Basque homeland today, it seems safe to say that the factions, and the various organizations, currently share that membership almost evenly.

The dissolution or expulsion of the EPK Central Committee took place on 26 October following a meeting held in Madrid by the Secretariat of the PCE Central Committee. This decision, which brought about the final split between Madrid and the EPK leadership, was made after a month of intense arguing, in which the "Carrillist" faction did not accept the process of convergence with the EE [Basque Left]-EIA or the decisions of its Central Committee, but did demand that a special congress be held.

The EPK Central Committee, with a majority of Lerchundi supporters, rejected the scheduling of this immediate special congress and considered it possible only after the integration process was completed. It also penalized several members of the secessionist wing, including Ormazabal, Tueros and Latierro.

With the dissolution of the Central Committee, the wishes of Basque "Carrillists" were granted: The PCE Central Committee's explicit support guaranteed their secessionist policy and enabled them to organize another parallel party. Of the 65 members of the present EPK Central Committee, only 19 became members of the new provisional committee appointed by Carrillo.

The EPK general secretary, who met with his associates that same night, considered the expulsion to be a crude maneuver, stating that "Santiago Carrillo and the PCE leadership have encouraged the EPK's division and the alteration of its policy. Unable to do so democratically, they have resorted to patently illegal, authoritarian methods, thus the responsibility for the schism is exclusively their own." The split was then final and each opposing faction made great efforts to regroup its supporters.

According to Miguel Quintas, a political official of the Urola region, the process and crisis within the EPK had been developing since the Fourth Congress was held and was subsequently confirmed in the 10th Congress in Madrid. The Urola group's "political intuition" brought on an immediate reaction from the area's communist officials, who were the first in the Basque country to voice their opposition: "Forging ahead of other groups, we oppose this text and demand that a special congress be called."

However, in the opinion of both Miguel Quintas and Nestor Rapp, an old PCE member and now an official of the Zarauz organization, "Neither our separation from the PCE nor the organic dissolution of the party in the Basque homeland can be accepted under any circumstances." Rapp stated more forcefully that "we wanted to rejuvenate the party; they were given key posts on the Executive Committee and despite the confidence which we showed in them, they did not do likewise. They believed that we were going to act like sheep, but they were wrong."

A serious split also took place in the capital of San Sebastian. Thus Ignacio Latierro, the leader of the "Carrillist" faction in the province, following his defeat in the Fourth Congress, made a harsh counterattack today: "I was convinced



that matters would end up where they are. The climate of the Fourth Congress was already an indication of the merger with EE-EIA. We saw how the process of betrayal was approaching."

At party headquarters in the commune of Portugalete, the largest headquarters in the province, old party members, some in retirement, were caught up in endless card games while the younger members, most of them loyal to Carrillo, prepared for the group's meeting.

In the opinion of Dionisio Mugica, a 53-year-old Babcock Wilcox employee and a party member since the 1960's, the merger between the leadership of EPK and EE-EIA "is not a convergence, it is a cop-out. We did not negotiate in this instance, we gave up." Proud of his eight Basque surnames, Dionisio said that Basquism should not be confused with nationalism: "I am more Basque than Garaiketxea, but I consider myself an exploited worker and I am therefore with the PCE."

Jose Gil, a 65-year-old Andalusian, Angel Antunez, a 37-year-old Extremaduran and blast-furnace foreman, and Manuel Felipes, a 76-year-old former anti-Franco campaigner, all agree that the present EPK leadership has betrayed its promises with the PCE and that they will never accept their departure. "We communists must be communists before anything else and being communist is the most important thing. We do not reject leftist unity, but we reject our party selling out to the Basque Left."

According to Roberto Lerchundi's group, supported to a large extent by Alava, Navarre and Guipuzcoa and by the groups of greater Bilbao and other areas in the province of Vizcaya, these accusations are unfounded and the secessionists, by their position, have dishonored the agreements approved by the majority in the last congress.

The need for convergence with the EE-EIA emerged after a clear process of analysis following the election defeat suffered by its party in the last elections. The Lerchundi faction, now a majority of the leadership, noted several months ago that the political process in the Basque homeland was different and that it would require a different approach. The group thus reached the conclusion that leftist state parties had made a mistake in their policy concerning the Basque region and that with only 4 percent of the vote, they could not attain power through an election. It was therefore necessary to redefine party strategy and to strengthen the left on the basis of a union of nonantagonistic forces.

For Txemi Cantera, a Workers Commissions leader and a current member of the EPK Executive Committee, the analysis made sense: "We realized," the young Bilbao economist remarked, "that the process had to be accelerated after the Fourth Congress, because we saw that following the 10th Congress in Madrid, the PCE would begin to isolate the faction in favor of change, because the EIA was going to hold its congress and we would have found ourselves with another party. There was no more time left; we therefore decided to play our card of 12 September."

In the Basque region, the "Carrillist" faction, sure of Madrid's support, went on the offensive. The sale of the weekly HEMENDIK, the official organ of the EPK, was banned in pro-Ormazabal groups; rowdy picketers boycotted several meetings of leaders; discussions concerning the first draft document for the merger between the EPK and EE-EIA were terminated. Roberto Lerchundi's articles in MUNDO OBRERO

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were criticized while Ormazabal and his allies had extensive coverage in the official PCE publication. Ties were even quickly established with relatives of party members on the left bank of the Bilbao estuary. These rather undemocratic methods, according to the Lerchundi faction, resurrected "the PCE's meddling and old Stalinist methods."

Santiago's Threats

According to Lerchundi, the schism was inevitable and its history dates back to September 1980. "Tomas Tueros, Ramon Ormazabal and myself were summoned by Santiago. During that meeting, Carrillo told us that there were only two alternatives: either we would let ourselves be dragged down by an independence movement and terrorism, something which the PCE could not allow, or there would be a merger with the Basque Left. He proposed to us that the Seventh Resolution of the congress be changed and I refused. Annoyed, Carrillo told me that just as he had made a sacrifice, 3 years ago, to Ormazabal of the EPK General Secretariat, now I would have to try to bring about party unity, adding that the important thing was unity, even though the party was mistaken in its policy."

Following that meeting, Lerchundi said that Carrillo began to hold secret meetings with Ormazabal and his allies, right after the Fourth Congress.

"Several days before the 10th Congress," Lerchundi said, "Carrillo asked me again to reorganize the Basque Executive Committee. When I refused, Santiago warned me: 'I'm going to go after you in the 10th Congress.'"

Following this split, the two EPK factions both scheduled congresses for this month, on 15 and 22 November. Although Lerchundi will have the support of most of his party's cadres, as well as that of the membership's professional and cultural groups, Ramon Ormazabal and his supporters will group together a large part of the working world, most of them immigrants, and the important support of the Workers Commissions leadership.

Single Class Consciousness

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 9 Nov 81 p 47

[Article by Ramiro Pinilla]

[Text] Many people are shocked over the terrible internal war from which we Basque communists are suffering and by the confrontation between some of us and the PCE. But not only did this have to happen, it will also prove beneficial. It is enormously sad, because it means the breakup of a family, but it will be beneficial in the long run. It cannot be termed merely a conventional struggle for power, but rather a struggle between two concepts of power, between two concepts of the party. It is a struggle between those who wish to perpetuate a party with a strong governing apparatus and those of us who are seeking a political group whose power would be distributed down to the lowest levels.

The 10th PCE Congress did not approve any of the proposed changes which we communists of particular nationalities or regions submitted to it. We are accused of being nationalists, independence advocates, mavericks. We are none of those things and

I am none of those things: at least not insofar as middle-class nationalism is understood, which is the only kind of nationalism that we have in the Basque region today.

One of the ultimate goals of the new EIA-EPK political force is a peoples' Europe in a socialist Europe, following a total development of self-government, of self-determination, of which our present constitution is a first step.

One of the conditions which the PCE specified for giving us its blessing on the alliance with the Basque Left was that the resulting group would declare that it was Eurocommunist. The hell with conditions! I prefer to act like a Eurocommunist rather than just be called one.

Communists outside the Basque country have told me: "At least you have an immediate way out (union with the EIA), but what will we do if the PCE deserts us?" It is impossible to talk about leftist unity and limit ourselves to municipal agreements with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]. The PCE would have to be amenable to the establishment, in the Basque region and anywhere else, of a new united leftist force, as would the PSOE.

In the Basque country, we are trying to unite two working worlds, the nationalist and the socialist, which have thus far been irreconcilable, in a single class consciousness. No one has taken this project seriously, except perhaps, among the communists, Juan Astigarrabia, a minister in the Basque government of 1936. But he was expelled from the party when the dogmatic and centralistic policy was established, which has led us to today's almost testimonial EPK, which adds to the dead weight common to any party that is behind the times, its separation from so individual a society as that of the Basques.

Thus this is the state of leftist unity in the Basque country. This is the up-to-date record of the principle of eliminating the gap between nationalist and socialist workers. Santiago Carrillo has to understand that this is extremely fortunate as a step toward socialism. Even though it entails painful splits. His "national reconciliation" in 1956 also implied a break with an outmoded communist past. I ask Carrillo--to whom Spanish democracy owes so much--to be amenable to our "national Basque reconciliation."

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